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AN ENGLISH VIEW OF THE CIVIL WAR.

VII.

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OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

THE situation, however discouraging to the North it was for the moment, was soon now about to change. The siege was about to begin that was eventually to entail the fall of the Confederate capital and the capture of Lee's devoted army. By the end of June, 1864, it is not surprising that much pressure was brought to bear upon President Lincoln to remove Grant and, somewhat later, to stop General Sherman's southward movement. It was then that Mr. Lincoln's historic phrase, that he would not "swop horses whilst crossing a stream," settled the policy of the Federal Government. It decided the fate of the war.

If for the moment we turn our attention from the Army of the Potomac to the campaign of General Sherman against General Joseph E. Johnston, we there find plenty of very interesting and instructive matter. It is difficult to believe that the army of which General Johnston assumed command when the campaign began could have been altogether in the splendid condition at that period which is attributed to it by General Hood. It was the same army which had been disastrously defeated by Grant at Chattanooga, and since that event no circumstances had occurred which could have tended to restore its *morale*, heavily shaken as it was by that disaster. There may or may not have been some errors of detail in the disposition of the army for the defence of Rocky-face Mountain, but with forces so superior to him as those of Sherman's were at this period, it is difficult to see how Johnston could have adopted any other rôle than the defensive one he actually assumed. According to the careful cal-

culatation of Major Dawes (page 281), his own army stood to Sherman's as 64 to 100 in point of numbers, but certainly in every respect inferior in point of equipment, and more especially in the supply of ammunition. His own estimate, which puts the figures as low as 4 to 10, though it is probably too low, marks, no doubt, his opinion, at the time, of the fighting powers of the two armies. It is not quite fair (as Major Dawes seems to do) to reckon up the casual replacements and reinforcements which reach a general during a campaign as, necessarily, additions to his original strength. The total number of men "to be accounted for" as "available for battle," given by Major Dawes as 84,328, leaves an entirely false impression on the ordinary reader, as though it meant that General Johnston had at some one moment an army of that size under his orders. As regarded his day-to-day fighting strength, he was very much in the position of the man who, with a very inadequate income, should receive small sums of capital at different times which he had to treat as income. In the aggregate those small sums might possibly reach a considerable amount, and if he had received them altogether and early in life, he might have lived handsomely upon the interest. But, as it was, his necessities obliged him to use up from time to time those sums for which critical friends said afterwards he should "account." Without, therefore, attempting to decide too positively between the estimates of General Johnston and of Major Dawes as to the available strength of the Confederate Army, I think it may safely be assumed that the fighting force of General Johnston's army was such that, for the time at least, a defensive and watching position was enforced on him.

It is difficult for a stranger to discuss the character of a country regarding which one of the two opposing generals who fought over it says :

"Mr. Davis and General Sherman exhibit a strange ignorance of the country between Dalton and Atlanta. Mr. Davis describes mountain ridges offering positions neither to be taken nor turned, and a natural fortress eighteen miles in extent, forgetting, apparently, that a fortress is strong only when it has a garrison strong enough for its extent; and both forget that, except Rocky-face, *no mountain is visible from the road between Dalton and Atlanta.*"

Yet in the middle of this very paper we have a picture of the Confederates dragging guns up "Kenesaw Mountain," which certainly conveys the impression that the "mountain" was at least a very steep and considerable hill. According to the map which

faces page 250, "Kenesaw Mountain" looks as if it ought to be pretty clearly visible from the road in question. The whole map indicates a series of ridges which appear to be mountainous. The word "mountain" is also scattered over it almost as thickly as peas in a pod. The words "Chattoogata Mountains," "Horn Mountains," "Pine Mountain," "Carnes Mountain," "Lost Mountain," etc., leave one in utter bewilderment between the meaning of General Johnston's expression and the meaning of the term "mountain" as locally used in those parts. One is obliged, therefore, to follow the campaign at some disadvantage in these respects. However, allowing for all differences as to the views of the writers and map-makers as to what is and is not a mountain, it seems tolerably clear that General Sherman successfully manœuvred Johnston out of his first positions at Dalton. They were not, however, positions which Johnston had any intention to hold seriously, for he very naturally considered them as too extensive for the force under his command.

The one opportunity for striking an offensive blow which presented itself to Johnston occurred at Cassville, and he took every step that was possible to him in order to take advantage of it. Either owing to some misunderstanding on General Hood's part or from some other cause not explained, Johnston's orders were not carried out, but the opportunity was lost through no fault on the part of General Johnston. No other presented itself up to the moment when he was deprived of his command, at which time he was busily engaged in preparing to take advantage of a temporary separation of General Sherman's army into two parts. The defects in execution which attended General Hood's attempt to strike this very blow, which had been suggested to him by Johnston, would have been much less likely to occur had Johnston remained in command. It was for the Confederates a fatal illustration of the danger of "swopping horses," either when you are "crossing a stream" in the figurative sense, or when your enemy is actually crossing a stream and you lose the chance to attack him. It does not seem from these pages that General Johnston can be fairly charged with any undue preference for a purely defensive course of action. In command of an inferior army, he wisely waited on the defensive, watching for time and opportunity to strike back at his skilful adversary. It was the faults of others and the impatience of the Confederate

Government which snatched from his grasp the chances that were presented to him.

In this history he appears simply as the Fabius of the war, whereas he was, in fact, only pursuing a Fabian policy at a time when it was the sole course open to him to avoid certain defeat. Always on the lookout for an opportunity to assume the offensive, he seems to have been always anxious to act in a very different manner from what he did, had circumstances favored his doing so. There are, however, some very interesting points which arise out of the events of this campaign, especially as to the effect which operations like those carried out by Johnston are likely to have upon the fighting value of an army. Many of the ideas and reasons which influenced his action could not have been known to his troops,—a condition of things which from the earliest ages has often turned soldiers against their commander. There has been, unfortunately, so much angry discussion over the events of this campaign, and so many contradictory statements as to fact and so many private reputations are involved, that it is peculiarly difficult to arrive at the truth. In attempting, therefore, to state the case as it is given in *The Century* papers, the military student is obliged to trust very much to his own judgment in the rejection or acceptance of the conflicting statements. One is naturally prejudiced in favor of those which appear to fit in best with the story as a whole and those which are most in accordance with the general experiences of war.

The first question that naturally arises is, What was the state of the Confederate Army when Johnston handed over the command to General Hood? The conclusion to be drawn as to the practical success or failure of Johnston's strategy up to that period will be very much influenced by the answer given to that question. As far as one can judge of the facts from the evidence we derive from General Sherman's own account, together with that supplied by General Johnston and in the main by others, it is that a most difficult task had been set before the Federal Army. It seems abundantly clear that, as long as General Johnston commanded against it, very little success that was of much value had been achieved. But, on the other hand, it is difficult not to attach some importance to the plea put forward by General Hood that the desertions from the Confederate Army had reached a most alarming figure, in consequence of General Johnston's con-

tinued retreat. His war of intrenchments, one line made after another, and always further and further to the rear, though it was terribly annoying to the Federal general, had, it was said, told seriously on the *morale* of the Southern troops.

It seems clear that, if the campaign were to be looked upon merely as a great game of chessmen, Sherman, by his long advance from Chattanooga to Atlanta, had rather weakened than strengthened his position. He seems to admit as much himself when he says: "Johnston had meantime picked up his detachments, and had received reënforcements from his rear which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 men, and warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far from our base, and that when the right moment should come he would turn on us and destroy us." (Page 252.) And again: "No officer or soldier who ever served under me will question the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston. His retreats were timely, in good order, and he left nothing behind." (Page 253.) Of course he says also, as any good soldier would, "We were equally confident, and not the least alarmed." (Page 252.) But there is no mistaking the meaning of the sentence, "At this critical moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable service.● Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of General Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to command the Confederate Army." That clearly represents the view of a most able and generous opponent as to the management of the Army of Tennessee by General Johnston, from the beginning of May, 1864, to July 18, 1864, when Hood succeeded to the command. But I do not see that any answer has been made from within the Confederate lines to General Hood's statement (page 336) that when on the night of the 9th of July the Confederate Army crossed the Chattahoochee River, "with one-third of their number lost," the men were "downcast, dispirited, and demoralized. Stragglers and deserters, the captured and killed, could not now, however, be replaced by recruits, because all the recruiting depots had been drained to reënforce either Lee or Johnston."

It is difficult to see what better Johnston could have done than adopt a Fabian policy during this time. If only it were possible to make the rank and file of an army understand the wisdom of such a policy at such a time, and to understand the advantages it would confer if discipline were strictly maintained,

and if its adoption did not tend seriously to discourage them, such a policy would be followed more frequently than it is, and it would often be a sure means to victory in the long run. But there are too many "ifs" in this proposition. The soldier is a human being and not a soulless machine; and a lengthened retreat, no matter how skilfully carried out, has always injured his fighting spirit, and I believe will always do so. The quotations I have already made from General Hood are strengthened by his reference, which can hardly be inaccurate, to the opinion of all his corps commanders. On the 15th of October they expressed the opinion that, although the army "had much improved in spirit, it was not in condition to risk battle against the numbers reported by General Wheeler." (Page 426.) It is true that in the meantime Hood had engaged in a series of offensive operations around Atlanta, but they were, at best, of doubtful value.

Taking the story as a whole, it seems to point out very clearly the practical danger, in its effect upon troops, of the most brilliant series of defensive actions, and that this is especially the case when those actions are fought behind earth-works constructed at each succeeding stage of a campaign, and further and further to the rear. I incline to think that something of the same kind of effect is to be noticed even in the army of General Lee from the time when the long series of earth-work operations began around Petersburg. General Hood's view of the condition of the Army of Tennessee at the time when he took over the command has been so far accepted, because it appears on the whole to be confirmed by other evidence and to be in accordance with the general experience of war in such cases. Moreover, General Sherman, with all his respect for Johnston, speaks of the superior *morale* of his own army at this time. General Hood accounts for his own ill-success on every occasion by pouring out blame upon his subordinate leaders. This sort of explanation cannot be accepted as strictly impartial history. In a recently-published volume of the Duke of Wellington's conversations there is a remark about Napoleon's campaign of 1814, which our great captain, like most educated soldiers, regarded as one of the most brilliant, if not the most brilliant, of all the performances of that great master of the art of war. The Duke, answering some characteristically flippant remark of Croker's on the subject, refers to the series of victories which Napoleon gained over army after

army in that campaign, and then, speaking from his own vast experience, says : "I know *the nice calculation* of time and distance which is necessary to the working-out of such combinations."

Some commanders are said to be "unlucky," which may sometimes mean that fate has really been continuously adverse to them. Far more often, however, it means that, whilst in conception their paper schemes may have been brilliant, they have failed in those nice calculations of time, distance, and other points to which Wellington attributed Napoleon's victories. Hood was certainly an "unlucky" commander. It is unfortunate for his reputation that his old classmates of West Point, represented so largely in the Federal Army opposed to him, should have fully anticipated from the first that he would be "unlucky." In speaking of a general who had been continuously unsuccessful, Lord Beaconsfield said to me : "They say he is unlucky, but my experience leads me to believe that want of luck is too often only a want of skill." It is impossible to say at each point where fate and where miscalculation caused General Hood's ill-luck. His original scheme for moving into the heart of Tennessee, with a view to draw Sherman after him, was dashing in the extreme. It is, however, very difficult to believe that he could have successfully carried his army "through the gaps in the Cumberland Mountains" to "attack Grant in rear" (page 427), and so on to Petersburg, as he appears to have contemplated. This is just one of those elaborate combinations of which Napoleon has said that their only defect is that they never succeed. Fate certainly struck him hard when, having urged that the railway to Decatur should be repaired, and that large supplies of stores should be gathered at Tusculumbia, he found on his arrival that nothing had been done.

This is one of those cases in which the want of one effective military head to the Confederacy, of which I have spoken heretofore, appears to have been disastrous. The Confederacy should have been governed from Lee's headquarters. In any case, it is clear that General Sherman's calculations of time, distance, and the resisting power which the stalwart Thomas would be able to gather in Tennessee against Hood, were right, and that General Hood's were fallacious. On the whole, it would seem that, for once at least, fate decided between the commanders with the blind

eyes of Justice. From the moment that General Sherman had decided upon the bold step of allowing Hood to do his worst in the rear of the Federal Army, the march of that army to the sea is a most interesting feat of arms, and had a most decisive effect on the result of the war. He justly urges that its importance did not depend so much on the success of his march from Atlanta to the sea as on the fact that at Savannah, after destroying the resources of the South, he was in a position to join hands with Grant by a march northward from Savannah to Goldsboro'. As he says, after the complete destruction of Hood's army by Thomas on December the 16th, 1864, this march from Savannah was "like the thrust of the sword toward the heart of the human body; each mile of advance swept aside all opposition, consumed the very food on which Lee's army depended for life, and demonstrated a power in the National Government which was irresistible." (Page 259).

Let us now return to the doings of Lee's army, which we left at Cold Harbor after the successful issue of its Wilderness campaign. Unfortunately for the readers of these papers, it requires a good deal of careful collation to get from them a clear picture of that most interesting period between June 3 and June 18, 1864—that is, between the end of the Wilderness battles at Cold Harbor and the time when, on June 18, at 11:30 A.M., Lee in person joined Beauregard before Petersburg. It was then that the siege of Lee's army by Grant may be said to have fairly begun. (Page 543.) It is necessary to compare Beauregard's "Four Days of Battle at Petersburg" with "General Grant on the Siege of Petersburg." In order to realize the circumstances under which at this time General Early was detached into the Shenandoah Valley, General Imboden's account of "The Battle of New Market" must be studied. The movements in the Shenandoah Valley, which, since Lee's retreat from Gettysburg, had led up to the battle of New Market and to the events which followed it, are also of importance. Briefly stated, it may be said that the Shenandoah Valley—one of the possible openings for supply which it was essential for Lee to keep open—had been for the moment secured to him by a success gained by Breckenridge over Sigel on May 15, 1864. It was not an unimportant event, because, during the Wilderness campaign, Lee could not have spared men to stop Sigel had he proved successful. But on

May 21 Hunter superseded Sigel in the command of the Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley, and began a series of movements which resulted, on June 5, in the defeat of the Confederates at Piedmont. Hunter pushed on with increased forces across the Blue Ridge, and moved upon Lynchburg.

It was under these circumstances that General Early, with Jackson's old corps, was despatched to reënforce the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, at the moment when Grant was arranging for the transfer of his army to join Butler before Petersburg. The battle of Cold Harbor had been fought on June 3, 1864, and on June 12 Early was despatched to the Shenandoah Valley. Then followed on that side what was the last offensive effort of the dying Confederacy, Early's march on Washington. By July 12 Early's retreat had begun from before Washington; by September 19 Sheridan had defeated him at Winchester, and on September 22 at Fisher's Hill. Despite an at first successful surprise of Sheridan's forces on October 19, Early's army on that day had been almost annihilated. Its destruction meant that one more of the avenues for food and supply was cut off from Lee's doomed army.

Meantime Grant's army had been transferred to the south of the James River, and for the time the Federal commander seems undoubtedly to have given Lee the slip. The movements began on the very day, June 12, that Early had started for the Shenandoah Valley. Up to this time General Beauregard had completely worsted Butler in all his attempts to employ his army against Petersburg or Richmond. The scheme which Beauregard describes on page 198, under the title of "The Defence of Drewry's Bluff," was proposed by him on May 12, 1864, for the destruction of Butler's army. It seems to have been wise and clever, and, as far as one can judge, it was then *the* scheme most likely to give a brilliant result. General Beauregard's idea was that an immediate, though temporary, transfer of 10,000 men from Lee's army, together with the addition of the troops in Richmond, to his own army south of the James River, would make him strong enough to destroy Butler. After Butler had been disposed of, his plan was that with this combined force he should fall upon the left of Grant's army. Until Butler had been disposed of, Lee was to fall back and take up a defensive position covering Richmond. This plan of operation certainly looks as if it were not only feasi-

ble, but one that would have afforded the best opportunity which the situation offered to the two Confederate armies. If carried out, it would have taken place during the five days' lull which succeeded the battle of Spotsylvania. If we are to judge by the success with which at Drewry's Bluff, on May 16, Beauregard rolled back Butler's army, and the narrowness with which that army avoided destruction,—owing its escape, in fact, to the error of General Whiting,—there does not seem any reason to doubt that General Beauregard's proposal, if vigorously carried out, might have been big with great results for the Confederacy. The only doubt seems to be whether food and transport could have been provided for Lee's already starving soldiers during the movement.

In any case, it seems clear that here again the want of a commander-in-chief over all the Confederate armies interfered with the possible execution of such a plan, and, indeed, it would seem, with any adequate and effective coöperation between the two armies of Lee and Beauregard, till they actually effected their junction. The situation when Grant's army began to reënforce Butler, and the four days' fighting before Petersburg commenced, is very noteworthy. A comparison of General Grant's account of those days' proceedings with that given by General Beauregard will show that, whilst, on the one hand, Lee was not aware that Grant's army had left his front, on the other, the Federals were completely imposed upon by the slender force which was interposed between them and Petersburg. The incident is thoroughly characteristic of the history of war, and suggests, not any hostile criticism of the commanders, but rather a reflection as to the strange conditions under which the command of great bodies of men had to be exercised in a country such as was then the field of operations.

The importance of the advantage which Grant had over Lee in this all-decisive matter of unity of command comes out strikingly here. First, when apparently, on May 12, it might have been possible for a large detachment from Lee's army to reënforce Beauregard, and, after defeating Butler, to join in an attack on Grant—an attack which, if successful, would have had decisive results. In the almost pathetic correspondence (pages 244–245) between Lee and Beauregard, there is in Lee's telegrams something almost like irritation at the fact that General Beauregard

wanted some one at Richmond to give him definite orders as to the force he should then send to Lee. Lee evidently felt that the event was one of such paramount importance that it ought to have been entirely and exclusively in his own hands. Yet he was compelled by a faulty and disastrous system of military administration and command to leave the question in Beauregard's hands. "The result of your delay will be disaster. Butler's troops will be with Grant to-morrow," is the expression of a man intensely anxious, who feels that at a critical moment he can only request assistance from a coequal ally, whilst his opponent has the absolute disposal of all the forces in his theatre of war. It is not to find fault with Beauregard that this is written. His great ability as a general, his loyalty, and his honesty of purpose are beyond criticism. The object is to emphasize the necessity of unity of command in war, for without it success must always be doubtful.

When General Grant, on June 12, began his transfer of force towards Petersburg, it is clear that his success in effecting that movement was due to his being able to act as commander-in-chief of the two armies of Meade and Butler. General Lee, on the other hand, could only act as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, and was at a disadvantage when he received from Beauregard—to whom he could not send orders—only warnings of what was taking place in his own immediate front. Information so received could not affect Lee's mind with the same force or certainty as the daily collected information received at his own headquarters would have done, had he been the commander in-chief of all the armies in that theatre of war. To those who are not familiar with the systematic working of the headquarters of a large army in these respects, it may be difficult to convey an idea of the enormous practical difference between the two sets of facts. The political exigencies of the moment often render the temptation very strong to adopt some such arrangement as that of the Confederates at this time, in which a sort of general headquarters for the two armies is established at the political capital. It is well, therefore, to insist here upon the important effect which it produced upon this part of the campaign.

The situation in the South at this time, when Bragg was acting as Mr. Davis's "chief of the staff," was almost exactly analogous to the situation at the North until General Grant

took supreme command. During all the time that elapsed between the appointment of General Halleck to a position nominally more dignified, but practically that of chief of the staff to Mr. Lincoln, and the moment when Grant assumed command of all the armies and took the field, General Halleck, in Washington, virtually directed all military operations under the President's authority. Grant reduced Halleck to his proper position, that of staff officer to himself, the commander-in-chief in the field. That in each instance the result was disastrous few who seriously study these papers will deny. There is so much in the arrangement that is plausible to a cabinet of civilians, and as it is one that may entail the most fatal consequences upon a nation, attention cannot be too forcibly drawn to it. To consider it rightly, the circumstances under which Halleck was appointed, apparently very much at the suggestion of General Pope, should be carefully studied. We have no explanation afforded as to the circumstances which led to the appointment of General Bragg, but probably they were very similar to those of which we have in General Pope's paper a full account in the case of General Halleck.

The final struggle now fairly began. The fate of Lee's army, despite the heroic resistance which it offered and the alternate successes and failures of the Crater battle and the sally against Fort Stedman, was being surely decided by events beyond its own immediate field. The fall of Fort Fisher on January 15, 1865, cut off an avenue of supply without which Lee had declared it would be impossible to feed his army. The advance of Sherman's army and the destruction of General Early in the Shenandoah Valley were events that closed in the net tighter and tighter around Lee's army, until, as Sherman says (page 259), by March, 1865, there was only one move left to Lee, viz., to abandon Richmond, join Johnston in North Carolina, and, if possible, destroy Sherman, and then turn upon Grant. General Sherman assumes that political considerations alone deterred Lee from carrying out this programme, although Sherman himself suggests that its success was problematical at best. All the evidence goes to show that Lee's troops were already starving, and almost without any means of transport. He, therefore, most probably did not attempt this move because he knew it had become impossible. After General Sheridan's gallant attack upon and capture of Five Forks from the famished and broken men of the old Army of Northern Vir-

ginia, the impossible had then to be attempted by Lee, and it soon become apparent how hopeless was the attempt. The military interest of the great struggle was over; the forces had become too unequal. The closing scenes were strikingly dramatic in their character; but all operations that could be of interest to the military critic ended long before Appomattox Court-House was reached.

The perusal of these papers has revived my remembrance of this great struggle and of the impressions it left upon me at the time. The routine of military duty had stationed me in the neighboring Dominion of Canada while this mighty fight was going on. It is not easy to describe the breathless interest and excitement with which from month to month, almost from day to day, we English soldiers read and studied every report that could be obtained of the war as it proceeded. No doubt many of our impressions of the facts, as we received them at the moment, required to be corrected by subsequent investigation. It takes a long time before the facts can be thoroughly threshed out from the mass of evidence bearing upon the complicated events of a great war that spread over a mighty continent. Nevertheless, in one respect, at all events, the broad impressions then formed are confirmed by the conclusions since arrived at, both from the more elaborate histories and from this most valuable series of papers. I refer to the opinion that, amid the crowds of able men, of gallant soldiers, and of clever statesmen whom the epoch of the American Civil War produced, the two men Abraham Lincoln and Robert Lee stand out a head and shoulders above all others. Neither of them was free from human error. Experience and the teaching of history warn us that perfection is a myth. But how great were both of these two great men in their several spheres! How modest, how wise, how self-restrained, how generous, how large in their views, and how grandly patriotic, as each understood patriotism!

An eminent Greek master taught that mortals are to be judged happy or otherwise according to the ending of their lives. Judging by this test, is it Abraham Lincoln or Robert Lee that we should regard as the favorite of the gods? It was Mr. Lincoln's fate to be struck down by the assassin at the moment when the cause for which he had lived and struggled had absolutely

triumphed—a circumstance which has forever identified his death with the life of his country. Was this a nobler death than Lee's? He, the foremost man in the Confederacy, the General, the idol of the South, retired from his high command to a private, a humble position. He refused repeated offers of wealth and comfort, in order to devote his remaining years to serve his ruined State in the way in which he believed he could be most useful to it—namely, the education of her sons and the training of her citizens, by his great example, to have faith in Virginia's future. One hardly knows which ending the Greek master of old would have admired the more.

One other remark before closing this series of articles, which have at least afforded me most interesting work, whether my humble criticism shall or shall not be profitable to others. I make it with considerable diffidence, both because I am a soldier and because I am not a citizen of the United States. As a soldier, it may be thought that I am prejudiced in what I say, and as an Englishman, that I can only speak of the effect of the great American Civil War from the outside rather than from within. What I have to say is that if one were compelled to choose between condoling with American friends on the terrible misfortunes they underwent in that war, or of congratulating them upon the ennobling effect which that war has had upon their people, one would unhesitatingly congratulate them upon the fact that such stirring and ennobling incidents as those which fill the volumes I have reviewed did occur in American history, a quarter of a century ago.

It has been said—foolishly, I think—that the nation is happy whose annals are uninteresting. If anything so preposterous could be true, we should thank God to have been born in a country every page of whose history was replete with heart-stirring events. To eat the fruits of the ground in a warm, balmy climate, with all sorts of comforts round one, may furnish the materials for a happy, passive, uneventful, almost vegetable existence in equatorial Africa. But would there be any pride in belonging to the Anglo-Saxon race if we had no Crécy, Agincourt, Armada, or other glorious achievement of our ancestors to look back upon? What would England be if there had been no Marlborough, no Wellington, no Nelson, no Chatham, Pitt, or Clive, or Warren Hastings—no “men of action”? And since the

greatest writers have always breathed the patriotic spirit of their own times, no Shakespeare, no Milton either? How could any Miltons or Shakespeares have been born in a country of purely bovine delights, whose history was a blank? Without war, there would, in fact, be no history at all. And yet, without any doubt, the statesman or the soldier who would not devote all his energies to save his country from what all must regard as the appalling calamity of civil war, or indeed from any war, would be an unprincipled villain. But when all has been done that can be done by statesmen or soldiers to stave off the calamity, surely the effects of war upon the country are not all bad. It is a fearful evil, but an evil for which greater good often compensates. Would the United States now prefer to have had no Washington, no Lincoln, none of the many heroes of the War of Independence and of the Civil War, in order to blot out the record of all war from the pages of its history? Would it be better for the future generations of American citizens that, as mere characters, all such heroes as Robert Lee and Stonewall Jackson should never have lived and fought?

In the nation that has never gone through the fiery ordeal of war,—if there be such a nation,—that has never had to encounter circumstances of difficulty and of danger which have threatened its very existence, that has never endured calamities which have tested its men's fibre, there can be no great characters, no lofty figures. It is not a noble, a glorious, or an admirable epoch in the history of any people when the great hero of the hour is the best platform orator or the best money-grubber.

I close the pages of this volume with a sincere feeling of thankfulness and pride that I belong to the race from which sprang the soldiers and sailors who fought upon both sides in this memorable struggle. Who can say which to admire the more—the Southern pluck and daring, or the stern, sober determination which eventually led the North to victory?

WOLSELEY.